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Trade unions have a rational incentive to oppose the adoption of labour-saving technology when
labour demand is inelastic and unions care much for employment relative to wages. Trade
liberalisation typically increases trade union technology opposition. These conclusions are reached in
a model of unionised international duopoly with two-way trade. We also find that the incentive for
technology opposition is stronger in the more technologically advanced country and in the country
with the larger home market, complementing earlier explanations for technological catch-up and
leapfrogging.
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1. Introduction
Is technological progress friend or foe of ordinary workers? If one adopts a long-term
perspective, the answer is obvious. However, with a shorter time horizon the question0022-1996/$ -
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conditions, but the labour-saving potential of technological improvement could also spell
job losses and wage cuts. The final outcome for workers will depend crucially on the
particularities of the situation. In history, the perhaps most famous example of technology
resistance is the Luddite revolts in England 1811–1812.1 Framework knitters and weavers
broke the new labour-saving machinery in their industries until harsh use of capital
punishment subdued the riots. Even though the Luddite campaign and similar incidents
during early British industrialisation were largely futile, the Luddite position appears
rational enough. To quote Duvall (1969): bMost people in 1811 and 1812 found it difficult
to appreciate the value of new machinery economizing labour at a time when goods were a
glut upon the market and when there was, in any case a surplus of labour available.Q
Questions about technology and the labour market are obviously not only of historical
interest. A prominent example of modern Luddism is the way printers’ unions in many
countries managed to postpone the introduction of new technology for what actually
amounted to decades. This was mainly achieved by forcefully (ab)using strict demarcation
rules describing which tasks members of different unions could or could not perform. An
overview of the history of printers’ unions technology opposition in the UK–where
unions’ control of the publishing industry did not begin to crumble until the mid-1980s–
can be found in Mowatt and Cox (2001).
The printers’ unions example may be an extreme one, but in today’s world of
globalisation and rapid technological progress, the adoption of new technologies and
accompanying workplace reforms are high on the industrial relations agenda in many
countries, and the rate of technology adoption is likely to be significantly affected by
labour market institutions, including trade unions. In a recent empirical study, Gust and
Marquez (2004) find that regulations affecting labour market practices are important
impediments to the adoption of IT technology, and that differences in labour market
regulations play an important role in explaining the recent divergence in productivity
growth rates between the US and Europe. Of course, the more restrictive labour market
regulations in many European countries are to a large extent reflections of the traditional
stronghold of trade unions, and unions also play an active role in issues related to
workplace reform in most of these countries. In a study of employee participation in
company restructuring in 16 European countries, Jørgensen and Navrbjerg (2001)
demonstrate in great detail how trade unions are heavily involved in, and sometimes
strongly opposed to, restructuring and workplace changes, including the introduction of
new technology. In many cases, employee influence on technological change is also
legally protected.
Union resistance to the introduction of new technology is not only a European
phenomenon, though. This is often a hot issue even in the US, where trade unions are
generally weaker. One example is the extended conflict in the latter half of the 1990s
between the United Autoworkers Union (UAW) and the major US carmakers, in
particular General Motors, over various labour-saving workplace reforms, such as the1 The movement was named after dGeneralT Ned Ludd, but it is historically unclear if this was the instigator of
the revolt, an alias used by several of the leaders, or simply an imaginary hero.
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strikes.2,3 Perhaps the most striking recent example of dmodern LuddismT in the US is the
industrial action taken by West Coast dockworkers in 2002 to prevent the introduction of
new technology that enabled automated port operations. After a heated period of strikes
and lock-outs, the ports were finally re-opened due to a court injunction sought by
President Bush.4
The process of globalisation and increased international competition is arguably
associated with an increased rate of workplace reform–some of which are driven by
rapid technological progress–in many industries, which makes the relationship
between globalisation and industrial relations an important and often hotly debated
issue. The purpose of our paper is to make a somewhat narrower contribution to this
very broad issue by providing a theoretical analysis of rational Luddism under
globalisation.
It is probably no coincidence that the original Luddite movement arose when it did.
The years 1811–1812 were miserable ones for British industry, one chief reason being
that Napoleon blockaded British exports to the continent.5 Blockades of this type are
surely less likely now than under Napoleon, but harsher competition from abroad could
perhaps trigger union opposition to technological change in much the same way? Or
would workers be eager to give their companies a head start in international competition,
so that union resistance to change is weakened? Attempting to disentangle questions as
these, we employ a model of unionised international oligopoly, where trade costs of
various sorts occur when goods are shipped from one market to the other. Globalisation is
taken to mean that these trade costs are reduced, so that each national market is more
exposed to foreign competition, but at the same time it is easier also for domestic firms to
sell goods abroad.
Our main finding is that globalisation tends to increase the likelihood that workers
oppose new technology, provided that the industry in question is characterised by two-way
trade, and given that relative market sizes are not too unequal. Under these circumstances,
increased competition from abroad–due to globalisation–is counteracted by easier access
to foreign markets, causing total labour demand to increase. This contributes to making2 See McAlinden (1997).
4 See Greenhouse (2002).
5 As an aside, it is noteworthy that times were harsh not only for workers, but for many industrialists, too. When
Prime Minister Spencer Perceval, who introduced capital punishment for machine breaking in the Framebreaking
Act, was shot dead in the lobby of the House of Commons in 1812, the assassin was not a Luddite rebel, but a
bankrupt businessman.
3 In another example from the automotive industry, Lansbury et al. (2002) couple the bankruptcy of Kia Motors
with slow adoption of new technology, and hint that union resistance might have played a role. The Korean auto
industry was built up using relatively labour-intensive Fordist mass production in a time when military rule kept
wages down. When Kia tried to switch to Toyota-style lean production, unions had become more powerful, and
the attempts had mixed success. In the economic slump during the Asian financial crisis in 1997, Kia went
bankrupt and was in the end taken over by Hyundai. Of course, if union opposition is indeed to be blamed for the
demise of Kia, it can hardly be called rational Luddism, at least not ex post rational, but it nevertheless serves as
an example of how trade unions can successfully (in the narrower sense) prevent or postpone the adoption of new
technology.
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if new labour-saving technology is introduced. Consequently, the likelihood that a trade
union will oppose the implementation of such technology increases. If technology
opposition hurts the interests of future generations of workers, this problem is aggravated
by globalisation.
We also ask what market size and relative technological position might imply for
technology opposition by unionised workers. We find that technology opposition is larger
in a country with a large home market and with a technological advantage. This points to
an explanation why technological laggards sometimes catch-up with more advanced
countries or even overtake them, to complement other explanations that has been offered
for this phenomenon.
On a more general level, our paper relates to a vast literature that deals with labour
market effects of technological change, where much recent contributions centre on the
question if the widening wage dispersion especially in the US and the UK can be traced
back to new technology.6 The narrower question about the relationship between trade
unions and technological innovation–which is more closely related to the present study–
has also received much attention.7 Theoretical studies often focus on hold-up problems:
the fact that unions are powerful may discourage investments both in productive capacity
and in technology.8,9
The opposite question, how technological change affects the bargaining position of
workers, is analysed less frequently. The contribution by Dowrick and Spencer (1994)–
which serves as an important building block for the present analysis–is the theoretical
economics paper that tackle the Luddite question most directly: they ask when the
introduction of labour-saving technology hurts unionised workers, so that Luddite
technology opposition would be rational? They study a situation where, at the same time,
firms have market power in output markets and workers have market power in the labour
market. Rational Luddism occurs in their model when labour demand is relatively
inelastic. Also, the more a union values jobs rather than wage increases, the more likely
becomes rational opposition to technology changes.10 The present paper can thus be seen
as both an application and an extension of the Dowrick–Spencer paper, where we place the
analysis in the context of international trade and globalisation, and analyse how trade
liberalisation, relative market size and technological advantages affect union opposition to
technological change.6 Acemoglu (2002) offers an interesting overview.
7 See Menezes-Filho and Van Reenen (2003) for a survey both of theoretical positions and empirical evidence.
8 Grout (1983) and Manning (1987) were seminal contributions. Ulph and Ulph (2001) explicitly introduce
innovation in a unionised context, and compare bargaining structures that to different degrees open up for hold-
ups by workers after technological investment is sunk.
9 Some authors point out that unions can be beneficial for technology adoption. For example, Agell and
Lommerud (1993) and Moene and Wallerstein (1997) show how some unions’ taste for wage compression can
dpushT the economy towards structural change and modernisation.
10 The Dowrick–Spencer model analyses technology and wage and employment changes within various given
structures of labour market institutions. Acemoglu et al. (2001) develop a model where skill-biased technical
change leads to deunionisation, because the coalition among skilled and unskilled workers is undermined.
Deunionisation removes the wage compression imposed by unions and therefore amplifies the direct effect that
skill-biased technical change has on wage inequality.
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unionised oligopolies. Key references are Naylor (1998, 1999).11 Naylor uses a framework
that has many similarities to our model, most importantly the combination of international
unionised oligopoly and monopoly union wage setting. Naylor stresses that globalisation
need not be hurtful for organised labour. Harsher competition can in fact imply that both
employment rises and wages go up if the industry is characterised by two-way trade.12
However, technology is not an issue in Naylor’s analysis, so although the present model
shares many traits with Naylor’s framework, we analyse a distinctly different question by
studying workers’ incentives to sabotage the application of new technology. Our results
complement Naylor’s research by stressing that, although globalisation may be beneficial
for unionised workers for a given production technology, it may also make workers more
vulnerable to technological change.
Finally, it should be underlined that the results from this kind of unionised oligopoly
model fit rather poorly with historical Luddism. Our model shares with Naylor the
prediction that harsher competition in an international oligopoly under fairly mild
assumptions will imply increased labour demand. Globalisation can lead to more
technology opposition precisely because labour demand goes up. As already underlined,
the original Luddite revolts broke out in a period of very low labour demand, which does
not tally well with this aspect of the model. The models of Dowrick–Spencer and
ourselves investigate when a union representing all workers will oppose technology. A
revolt, on the other hand, can be instigated by a subset of workers, for example by the
frustrated workers who have already lost their jobs, so the question of when the
introduction of new technology leads to massive protests from some of the workers, is a
slightly different one from the one we attempt to answer here.132. Model
There are two firms, each producing a differentiated product. Firm 1 is located in
country 1 and firm 2 in country 2. Competition is assumed to be Cournot, but it can easily
be shown that the qualitative results do not change if we instead analysed the case of
Bertrand competition.14 We adopt the segmented market hypothesis, where firms13 Moreover, workers in Britain 200 years ago were living close to subsistence level: then, in a downswing,
workers might give extreme priority not to lose their job. The present study uses a Stone–Geary union utility
function, which is convenient for tractability reasons and very often used in this type of analysis. However, it is
not fully general, and the possibility that the employment priority in union utility rises very sharply in a downturn
is therefore ruled out by assumption.
14 An analysis of the Bertrand case is available in the Working Paper version, available at http://skylla.wz-
berlin.de/pdf/2003/ii03-18.pdf.
12 Naylor assumes products to be homogenous and discusses Cournot competition. Gu¨rtzgen (2002) obtain
similar results for the Bertrand differentiated products case.
11 See also, for example, Lommerud et al. (2003), Lommerud et al. (2005, in press), Meland (2002), Straume
(2002, 2003), Neary (2002), Andersen and Sørensen (2003), Piperakis et al. (2003) and Munch and Skaksen
(2002). Staiger (1988) shares Naylor’s prediction that the union wage premium may rise with intensified
international competition, but in a different model framework.
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in country i (by firm i) and sold in market j is denoted qij, so that total sales for firm i–
denoted qi –is given by qi=
P
j=1
2 qij. Demand is assumed to be linear
16, with the inverse
demand functions for goods 1 and 2 in market j given by
p1j ¼ a 1
sj
q1j þ bq2j
 
; ð1Þ
and
p2j ¼ a 1
sj
q2j þ bq1j
 
; ð2Þ
where sj N0 is a measure of the size of market j, and ba (0,l) is a measure of product
differentiation.
Both firms operate under constant returns to scale with labour as the only input. Let ni
denote the amount of labour employed in the production of good i. The following
technology applies:
qi ¼ /ini; ð3Þ
where /i N0 is a firm-specific technology parameter.
There are two cost components: each unit of labour employed by firm i is paid a wage
rate wi. In addition, there is a trade cost, t, associated with shipping one unit of a good
between the two countries. In principle, these trade costs can include both tariff and non-
tariff cost components. We further assume that the labour market in country 1 is unionised,
whereas the firm located in country 2 can recruit workers from a competitive labour
market at a wage rate w2=w
.17,18 For simplicity, we assume that the outside wage (that
can be earned outside the oligopoly industry) for workers in country 1 also equals w. To
save notation, we set w1=w.
We adopt the monopoly union model, where the trade union in country 1 freely chooses
the wage at a stage prior to the Cournot subgame.19 Union preferences are characterised by
the following Stone–Geary-type utility function:
U ¼ w wð Þhn1; ð4Þ15 The segmented markets oligopoly model was made popular by Brander and Krugman (1983). Neary (2003)
presents a general equilibrium picture of international oligopoly with segmented markets.
17 Early contributions to unionised oligopoly models include Brander and Spencer (1988), Dowrick (1989) and
De Fraja (1993).
18 Lommerud et al. (2003) and Straume (2003) are other examples of international oligopoly models with
asymmetric union power across countries. Naylor (1998, 1999) and Haaland and Wooton (2003) study situations
where unions are equally powerful in all countries.
19 For tractability reasons, the combination of linear Cournot oligopoly and monopoly unions is commonplace in
the literature on unionised international oligopoly. The monopoly union can be seen as that special case of the
right-to-manage model where unions have all the bargaining power. We use this model as a simple representation
of a situation where wage bargaining is inefficient because workers have a larger degree of control over wage
setting than over how employment is determined. However, in Section 6 we use numerical simulations to analyse
the effect of wage bargaining.
16 This assumption can be considerably loosened while the main results are still maintained. See footnote 29 for
a further discussion.
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union. Note that h =1 corresponds to a rent-maximising union.
The source of the labour-saving technological change is taken to be exogenous, and we
follow Dowrick and Spencer (1994) by analysing the effect of a marginal increase in the
technology parameter /i. We consider the following three-stage game:
! Stage 1: The union determines whether or not it will accept the implementation of a
labour-saving innovation.
! Stage 2: The wage rate in country 1 is unilaterally set by the trade union.
! Stage 3: Employment in each firm is determined by the firms’ simultaneous and
independent choices of optimal output levels for each market.
Stage 1 is not chosen for its realism. Rather, we want to study what the union would
have decided about technology if it had been given the chance. The domestic union may
well be in a position where it can sabotage introduction of labour-saving innovations.
Firms may anticipate that unions will not necessarily concede to the changes in manning
rules, remuneration systems and the like that new technology requires. Firms may then
in various ways be able to bribe workers to facilitate the introduction of innovations, but
technological change will nevertheless be more costly and we should expect to see less
of it. In other cases, unions and workers have no influence over technology choice, for
example when an upstart firm builds a new plant ahead of hiring any workers. The
present analysis is then not a positive analysis of technology adoption, but simply asks
if workers benefit or not from the technological changes that do take place, something
that in turn could constitute an important part of a normative analysis of technology
policy.
We solve by backwards induction. The next section discusses the production game at
stage 3.3. Product market equilibrium
For given wages and technologies, each firm maximises profits by choosing the optimal
level of sales for each market. The optimisation problem facing firm 1 is thus
max
q11;q12
p1 ¼ p11  w/1
 
q11 þ p12  w/1
 t
 
q12
 
: ð5Þ
The first-order conditions are given by
q11 ¼
as1  bq21  s1 w/1
2
ð6Þ
and
q12 ¼
a tð Þs2  bq22  s2 w/1
2
: ð7Þ
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the following equilibrium quantities:
q11 ¼ s1
a 2 bð Þ þ bt þ b w/2  2
w
/1
4 b2 ; ð8Þ
and
q12 ¼ s2
a 2 bð Þ  2t þ b w/2  2
w
/1
4 b2 : ð9Þ
Obviously, the problem facing firm 2 is similar, so that the equilibrium quantities q21 and
q22 are of a similar structure as the expressions given above.
In an international duopoly, three different trade regimes are logically possible:
two-way trade, one-way trade or autarky. Two-way trade means that both duopolists
export into the neighbouring market, so this is intra-industry or cross-hauling trade of
the same good. One-way trade means that one of the duopolists export, but not the
other. Arguing slightly outside the model, if there are several oligopolies in an
economy, we will expect a country to export the goods from some oligopolies, but
import the goods from others, so then the actual result in the one-way trade case is
inter-industry trade.
Our focus here, however, will be on two-way trade. Lommerud et al. (2003) discuss
in detail, in a related set-up, under what trade costs what regime will arise in
equilibrium.20,21 Two-way trade generally occurs for relatively dlowT trade costs. When
we study trade liberalisation with two-way trade, this means that what we have in mind
are economies that are rather well integrated to begin with but where trade costs are
lowered even more. There always exists a range of the model parameters for which the
equilibrium entails two-way trade. To see this, note that as the trade costs approach zero,
the firms either produce for both or none of the markets (the effective production costs
for the two markets are the same). Consequently, the union will–for such very low trade
costs–never want to set a wage so high that the unionised firm does not export.
Similarly, the foreign firm cannot be induced to stop shipping goods into the union
home country either. It could be that the unionised economy had a large technological
lead, but if it is not profitable for the laggard to export at almost zero trade cost, the
laggard will not find it profitable to operate in his home country either, so we would not
have an operative duopoly. In general, a sufficiently low level of trade costs induces
two-way trade in equilibrium.21 See also Naylor (1999) and Straume (2003) for discussions of trade patterns in unionised international
oligopolies.
20 Note that even though labour costs will be higher in the unionised country, there may be one-way trade from
the unionised to the non-unionised country if the technology of the unionised firm is sufficiently better than that
of the non-unionised firm.
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n1 wð Þ ¼
s1 þ s2½  a 2 bð Þ þ b w/2  2
w
/1
h i
 t 2s2  s1bð Þ
/1 4 b2ð Þ
: ð10Þ
4. Union wage setting
The union’s wage setting is governed by a trade off between wages and employment.
The first-order condition for optimal wage setting, on a general form, is given by
e1 wð Þ ¼ hw
w w ; ð11Þ
where e1 wð Þ:¼  Bn1 wð ÞBw wn1 wð Þ is the wage elasticity of labour demand for the unionised
firm. More inelastic labour demand (lower e1) increases the equilibrium wage. Obviously,
the wage will be higher the stronger the union values wages over employment, as
represented by h. Using (10), the equilibrium wage in the two-way trade regime is found
to be
w4 ¼
s1 þ s2½  /1ha 2 bð Þ þ w 2þ hb /1/2

 h i
 /1ht 2s2  s1bð Þ
2 1þ hð Þ s1 þ s2ð Þ : ð12Þ
Some comparative statics properties of (12) can be immediately established. Less
differentiated products (higher b) will intensify competition and reduce the union wage
level. A contraction (expansion) of demand from the home (export) market will have the
same effect, provided that there are positive trade costs. Likewise, an increase in
productivity for the foreign firm will also have a negative impact on the union wage. This
is all quite intuitive. Our main concern, however, is the effect of a change in the
technology parameter of the unionised firm, /1. This is explored in detail below.5. Union opposition to technological change
This section contains the main building blocks for the subsequent analysis. It is
important to emphasise from the outset that the main results from the first part of this
Section have already been confirmed by Dowrick and Spencer (1994) under more general
assumptions on product demand and union utility. Thus, the main underlying mechanisms
of the model generalises beyond the special assumptions of the current paper, which can be
viewed as an application of the general model of Dowrick and Spencer in the context of
international oligopoly and trade liberalisation. It is nevertheless instructive to recapitulate
and elaborate on these underlying effects in our specific context.
We consider an incremental labour-saving innovation in the unionised firm, i.e., a
marginal increase in the technology parameter /1. The effects on equilibrium wages and
employment and union utility will be analysed consecutively.
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A labour-saving innovation will cause a wage response from the union insofar as
the innovation changes the own-wage elasticity of labour demand. It is useful to
decompose the total effect into a slope-of-demand effect and a demand-shifting effect:
in general, an increase in /1 changes both the slope of the labour demand curve and
the demand for labour at the pre-innovation wage. Labour demand elasticity is
affected through both channels. Starting with the first effect, from (10) we can easily
calculate
B
B/1
 Bn1 wð Þ
Bw
 
¼  4 s1 þ s2ð Þ
/31 4 b2ð Þ
b0; ð13Þ
implying that increased labour productivity reduces the wage responsiveness of labour
demand. This is very intuitive: if workers are highly productive, an increase in the wage
level will have only a moderate impact on the effective wage rate (w//1). Ceteris paribus,
this effect makes labour demand less elastic and pulls in the direction of higher wage
claims by the union.
A labour-saving innovation also affects labour demand directly, in two different ways.
On the one hand, it reduces the marginal cost of production, w//1, which tends to increase
the demand for labour. This again provides an incentive for the union to increase wage
claims. On the other hand, a labour-saving innovation increases the productivity of each
worker, which has the opposite effect on labour demand, since the same production
quantity can now be produced using fewer workers. Thus, the overall demand-shifting
effect is generally ambiguous. From (10) we can derive
Bn1 wð Þ
B/1
¼
2 s1 þ s2ð Þw 1 1e1 wð Þ

 
/31 4 b2ð Þ
; ð14Þ
implying that increased labour productivity causes a reduction (increase) in labour
demand if the wage elasticity of labour demand–at the pre-innovation level–is below
(above) unity.22 If labour demand is inelastic, a small reduction in the marginal cost of
production (w//1) leads to a less than proportionate increase in the demand for effective
labour (/1n1).
23 Consequently, the firm does not need the entire existing labour force–
which is now more efficient–to meet the new demand for effective labour, causing
labour demand to fall. Obviously, the opposite result holds true for elastic labour
demand.
Although the slope-of-demand effect and the demand-shifting effect may work in
opposite directions, the net impact on labour demand is that it becomes less elastic.22 This result–which generalises beyond linear demand–corresponds to Proposition 1 in Dowrick and Spencer
(1994).
23 Using (3), it is easily shown that the elasticity of labour demand with respect to the wage level is equal to the
elasticity of effective labour demand with respect to the effective wage, i.e., e1 ¼  B /1n1ð ÞB w=/1ð Þ
w=/1ð Þ
/1n1ð Þ .
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by increasing the wage level. From (12) we find that
Bw4
B/1
¼ h
a 2 bð Þ þ b w/2
h i
s1 þ s2½   t 2s2  s1bð Þ
2 1þ hð Þ s1 þ s2ð Þ : ð15Þ
A closer inspection of (15) reveals that Bw* /B/1N 0 for all permissible values of the
model parameters.24
5.2. Equilibrium employment
The total effect of a technological improvement on employment is given by
dn1 w4ð Þ
d/1
¼ Bn1 wð Þ
B/1

w¼w4
þ Bn1 wð Þ
Bw

w¼w4
Bw4
B/1
:
From (15) we know that the second term is unambiguously negative. Thus, a net
increase in employment as a result of a labour-saving innovation requires that the first
term, Bn1(w) /B/1, is positive, and sufficiently large to dominate the second term. Using
(14), this is equivalent to saying that e1 must be sufficiently larger than 1. From (10) and
(12) we find that Bn1(w*) /B/1N0 if
s1 þ s2ð Þ /2/1a 2 bð Þ þ w b/1  4/2ð Þ½ b/2/1t bs1  2s2ð Þ;
which is true only for a relatively small subset of the valid parameter configurations.
5.3. Union utility
Whether or not the trade union will (rationally) resist the introduction of a new
labour-saving technology ultimately depends on how union utility is affected. We can
derive a simple condition that is independent of specific functional forms. Consider a
general-form utility function U[w (/1), n1 (w (/1), /1)]. Now, invoking the envelope
theorem, the effect of a labour-saving innovation on equilibrium union utility is simply
given by
dU w4 /1ð Þ; n1 w4 /1ð Þ;/1ð Þ½ 
d/1
¼ BU dð Þ
Bn1
Bn1 wð Þ
B/1

w¼w4
: ð16Þ
Thus, the union will endorse the introduction of new technology only if it leads to an
increase in labour demand. This follows from the monopoly union assumption.25 Since a25 In Section 6 we analyse how Nash wage bargaining affect the results.
24 Using the condition for q12N0 in (9), it can easily be verified that Bw*/B/1N0 under two-way trade.
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change at the optimal level, and only the labour demand effect matters. From (14), it
follows that dU / d/1N0 if and only if labour demand is elastic, i.e., e1N1.
As long as labour demand elasticity is not constant along the labour demand curve, the
demand elasticity at the equilibrium wage level depends indirectly on union preferences.
We can therefore express the condition for union opposition to technological change in
terms of the preference parameter h. When labour demand elasticity is increasing in the
wage level–which is true for a wide class of demand functions, including the linear
specification26–a more wage oriented union will choose a wage on a more elastic part of
the labour demand curve, and vice versa. It follows that the labour demand response to
innovation, Bn1(w) /B/1, is monotonically increasing in the wage preference parameter h,
which means that there exists a unique critical value h*, characterised by
Bn1 w h4ð Þ½ 
B/1
¼ 0;
and
Bn1 w h4ð Þ½ 
B/1
b Nð Þ0 if hb Nð Þh4:
Thus, the condition e1N1 translates into a condition that the union must be sufficiently
wage oriented (h Nh*) to benefit from the introduction of a labour-saving innovation. In
our specific model, inserting equilibrium wages and employment into the union utility
function, we derive
h4 ¼ 1
4 w

/1
s1 þ s2ð Þ
a 2 bð Þ þ b w/2
h i
s1 þ s2½   t 2s2  s1bð Þ
: ð17Þ
Since h*b1, it follows that a rent-maximising union would never oppose technological
change.27
In the remainder of the analysis we will utilise the specific structure of our model to see
how changes in the key parameters of the model affect union attitudes towards
technological change. For the union not to try to sabotage productivity-enhancing
technological change, the union must be sufficiently wage oriented. In line with this, we
adopt the following interpretation of the model: any structural change that increases
(reduces) the critical value h* is said to increase (reduce) the likelihood of union
opposition to technological change. Note that some unions may oppose technological
change both before and after some parameter changes, and some unions may be in favour
before and after. But if we picture the economy as consisting of many international
unionised oligopolies, where the various unions have different preferences over wages and26 From the definition of e1(w) we have that
Be1 wð Þ
Bw
¼ e1 wð Þ
w
1þ e1 wð Þ½   B
2n1 wð Þ
Bw2
w
n1 wð Þ, implying that
Be1 wð Þ
Bw
N0 for
concave, linear and dnot too convexT labour demand functions.
27 This result also generalises beyond the specific assumptions of our model, as demonstrated by Dowrick and
Spencer (1994).
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innovation.
5.4. Globalisation
The main aim of the paper is to analyse how globalisation–interpreted as a reduction of
trade costs between countries–affects union attitude towards labour-saving technological
change in oligopolistic industries.28 The following result is obtained:
Proposition 1. Globalisation increases the probability of union opposition to technolog-
ical change if (i) the industry is characterised by two-way trade, and (ii) the domestic
market is not too large relative to the foreign market.
Proof. From (17) we find that
Bh4
Bt
¼ 
4 2s2  s1bð Þ w/1 s1 þ s2ð Þ
a 2 bð Þ þ b w/2
h i
s1 þ s2½   t 2s2  s1bð Þ
n o2 b Nð Þ0; ð18Þ
if
s1b Nð Þ 2
b
s2: 5
The size-difference between markets referred to in Proposition 1 depends crucially on
how differentiated the two products are. For very close substitutes, the home market must
be less than twice the size of the foreign market. However, for unrelated products (bY0),
the above result essentially applies regardless of market sizes.
The intuition behind Proposition 1, which is not straightforward, can ultimately be
traced to the effect of trade liberalisation on labour demand, but first we have to do a
preliminary round of explanation. Trade liberalisation affects the critical value of h*
insofar as the effect of technological change on labour demand elasticity is influenced by
a reduction of trade costs. From (16) we know that the union will oppose technological
change if it reduces labour demand, which, in turn, depends on the wage elasticity of
labour demand. More specifically, a labour-saving innovation will reduce (increase)
labour demand if e1b (N) 1 at the pre-innovation equilibrium. Since labour demand
elasticity (in equilibrium) is monotonically increasing in h, it follows that trade
liberalisation increases the critical value of h* if it makes labour demand less elastic
in equilibrium. In more intuitive terms, if trade liberalisation reduces the probability
that technological change increases labour demand, then the trade union must be28 In line with our broad interpretation of trade costs, globalisation should be thought of as any measures taken to
reduce the costs of trade, including reduced tariffs, improved quality of infrastructure and reduced bureaucratic
barriers to trade.
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in order to ensure such a positive labour demand response. Indeed, from (12) and
(10) we derive
Be1 wð Þ
Bt

w¼w4
¼ 2 s1 þ s2ð Þw
 1þ hð Þ 2s2  s1bð Þ
/ a 2 bð Þ  w 2/1 
b
/2

 
 
s1 þ s2ð Þ  t 2s2  s1bð Þ
h i2 :
We see that the condition for trade liberalisation to reduce labour demand elasticity, and
thus the probability of a positive labour demand response of a technological improvement,
is precisely s1b (2s2/b).
Now, what remains to explain is the relationship between trade liberalisation and labour
demand elasticity. Since t does not affect the slope of the labour demand curve, the sign of
Be1(w) /Bt is determined by the sign of B wn wð Þ

 
=Bt. In this context, the effect of trade cost
reductions through changes in the equilibrium wage is a second-order effect that never
dominates the direct effect on labour demand, so trade liberalisation makes labour demand
less elastic if it simply increases the total demand for labour. From (10) it is easily found
that
Bn1 wð Þ
Bt
¼  2s2  s1b
/1 4 b2ð Þ
b Nð Þ0;
if
s1b Nð Þ 2s2
b
;
which confirms our intuition. It is important to note that this effect of trade cost reductions
on the elasticity of labour demand applies to a much larger class of demand systems than
the linear one.29
It is less strenuous to understand why trade liberalisation increases labour demand if
s1b (2s2/b). A reduction of trade costs implies that both firms improve their competitive
positions in their respective export markets. Thus, total labour demand will increase if the
gain of market share in the export market more than outweighs the loss of market share
domestically. Since reduced trade costs increase the degree of competition, and thus total
sales, in both markets, total labour demand from the unionised firm will increase unless the
domestic market is very large relative to the foreign market. If products are homogeneous,
the domestic market must be more than twice as large as the foreign market in order for the
unionised firm to reduce its labour demand in response to a reduction of trade costs.30
Perhaps the most interesting implication of this result regards social welfare.
Proposition 1 suggests that the traditional welfare gains of globalisation–increased29 Re-writing the labour demand function for the unionised firm on general form, n1(w,t), with e1 w; tð Þ: ¼
Bn1 w;tð Þ
Bw
w
n1 w;tð Þ being the corresponding own-wage elasticity, it is easily shown that trade cost reductions make
labour demand less elastic if  w
n1 w;tð Þ e1 w; tð Þ
Bn1 w;tð Þ
Bt
þ B2n1 w;tð Þ
BwBt

b0


. For a linear demand system we have that
(B2n1(w,t) /BwBt)=0, so in this case the inequality is satisfied if
Bn1 w;tð Þ
Bt
b0. Thus, in general, the analysis
applies to demand systems where (B2n1(w,t) /BwBt) is negative or not dtoo positiveT.
30 If products are independent (b =0), there is no deterioration of the firms’ competitive position in their
respective home markets, and consequently–in this case–labour demand always increases when t decreases.
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technological change in oligopolistic industries, which may reduce the rate at which new
labour-saving innovations are implemented.
It is important to note, though, that the assumption of two-way trade is crucial to the
result in Proposition 1. With, for example, one-way trade into the unionised market, trade
liberalisation means that the loss of market share for the unionised firm in the domestic
market is not compensated by increased export sales. This makes labour demand more
elastic, with a corresponding reduction of h*.31
5.5. Relative market size
Maintaining the assumption of two-way trade, we proceed by considering how union
attitude towards technological change depends on other key parameters of the model. In
accordance with our previous analysis, we explain our results by noting the effect of the
relevant parameters on labour demand elasticity. If a parametric change makes labour
demand less elastic, a labour-saving technological change is more likely to reduce the
demand for labour. This, in turn, increases the critical value of h, above which the union
will benefit from such a technological change.
Let us now consider how union attitude towards labour-saving innovations depends on
the relative size of the domestic market. We can establish the following result:
Proposition 2. Union opposition to technological change is more likely the larger the
domestic market is relative to the foreign market.
Proof. From (17) we have that
Bh4
Bs1
¼
4 w

/1
ts2 2þ bð Þ
a 2 bð Þ þ b w/2
h i
s1 þ s2½   t 2s2  s1bð Þ
n o2 N0
and
Bh4
Bs2
¼ 
4 w

/1
ts1 2þ bð Þ
a 2 bð Þ þ b w/2
h i
s1 þ s2½   t 2s2  s1bð Þ
n o2 b0: 5
How does an increase in market size–which is equivalent to an increase in the number
of consumers residing in the market in question–affect labour demand elasticity for the
unionised firm? Once more, it is useful to decompose the total effect into a slope-of-
demand effect and a demand-shifting effect. It is easily shown that an expansion of either
market makes labour demand more wage responsive. Since sales increase, a given increase
in wages now results in a larger reduction of labour demand.32 Ceteris paribus, this makes31 We refer to the Working Paper version for an analysis of one-way trade. This is available at http://skylla.wz-
berlin.de/pdf/2003/ii03-18.pdf.
32 From (10) we find that B
Bs1
 Bn1 wð Þ
Bw

¼ B
Bs2
 Bn1 wð Þ
Bw

¼ 2
/21 4b2ð Þ
N0



.
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implies that the demand-shifting effect works in the opposite direction, making labour
demand less elastic. The size of this effect depends on which market expands. As long as
tN0, the increase in sales–and thus labour demand–is larger if the domestic market
expands. It turns out that the demand-shifting effect dominates the slope-of-demand effect
if the market expansion occurs in the domestic market, making labour demand less elastic.
Consequently, union opposition to technological change increases. If the foreign market
expands, the opposite result applies. Finally, if t=0 the two effects exactly cancel, leaving
labour demand elasticity unchanged.
5.6. Technological advantage
Another key feature of the model is the possibility of a technological gap between the
firms in the industry. How will a technological (dis)advantage affect union attitudes
towards labour-saving innovations?
Proposition 3. Union opposition to technological change is more (less) likely if the
unionised firm has a technological (dis)advantage.
Proof. From (17) it follows that
Bh4
B/1
¼
4 w

/1
s1 þ s2ð Þ
/1 a 2 bð Þ þ b w/2
h i
s1 þ s2½   t 2s2  s1bð Þ
N0
(the denominator in the expression for Bh* /B/1, is confirmed positive by applying the
condition for q12N0 in (9)) and
Bh4
B/2
¼ 
4 w

/2

 2
b s1 þ s2ð Þ2
/1 a 2 bð Þ þ b w/2
h i
s1 þ s2½   t 2s2  s1bð Þ
n o2 b0: 5
Consider an increase in labour productivity for firm 1—interpreted here as a
dtechnological advantageT for firm 1. We know from the previous discussion that this
will make labour demand less elastic, due to the reduced wage responsiveness of labour
demand (see (13)). Obtaining a technological advantage will thus increase the likelihood
of union opposition towards the introduction of further labour-saving innovations, and
make it more difficult to increase the technological advantage. The opposite result applies
if the foreign firm gets a technological advantage. An increase in labour productivity for
this firm will unambiguously reduce labour demand from the unionised firm, making
labour demand from this firm more elastic.
The result in Proposition 3 suggests the presence of a dcatch-upT effect in the
introduction of new technology. Due to union opposition to technological change, it may
be more difficult to increase, or even sustain, a technological advantage.
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In the analysis so far, we have utilised a quite particular structural set-up with a
monopoly trade union in one country only. Here, we first ask whether our results survive if
both countries are unionised. Armed with this result, we discuss the possibility of
technological catch-up within this framework. Lastly, we look at the situation where wages
are subject to bargaining between the firm and the union.
6.1. Trade unions in both countries
Let us first investigate the implications of letting also the foreign firm be unionised.
Opening for the possibility of different union preferences in the two countries, we assume
that the union in country i maximises
Ui ¼ wi  wð Þhi qii þ qij/i
 
; i; j ¼ 1; 2; ip j: ð19Þ
We also assume that wages are set simultaneously in the two countries. Setting
w =w2 in the product market equilibrium expressions derived in Section 3, it is
straightforward to derive the wage equilibrium from (19). The equilibrium wage level in
country i is given by
wi4 ¼
4w/j hj þ 1
 þ 2hi/i a/j 2 bð Þ þ bw þ a/1/2W  /1/2ts1þs2 Xi
/j 4 1þ h1 þ h2ð Þ þ Wð Þ
; ð20Þ
where
Xi : ¼ hi sjhj 4 b2
 þ 2 2sj  sib  ;
W : ¼ h1h2 4 b2
 
N0:
Let the wage equilibrium be denoted by the vector w*. Using the envelope theorem, the
effect of a labour-saving innovation on union utility in country i is now given by
dUi w4ð Þ
d/i
¼ BUi w4ð Þ
Bni
Bni w4ð Þ
Bwj
Bwj4
B/i
þ Bni w4ð Þ
B/i
 
i; j ¼ 1; 2; ip j: ð21Þ
A union’s response to a marginal technological improvement is still determined by the
labour demand effect, but, comparing with (16) we see that there is now an additional
effect through the strategic wage response from the foreign country. This effect is
unambiguously negative. A technological innovation in firm i will worsen the competitive
position of the rival firm, whose union will respond by lowering the wage. This, in turn,
reduces labour demand from firm i.3333 It is straightforward to verify that Bni /Bwj N0 and Bwj* /B/i b0.
K.E. Lommerud et al. / Journal of International Economics 68 (2006) 1–2318The explicit expression for the critical value of hi, below which firm i’s trade union will
oppose technological change, is given by
hi4 ¼ 1
2 4þ hj 4 b2ð Þ
 
/jw

/i a/j 2 bð Þ 2þ hj 2þ bð Þ
 þ 2bw  /2t
s1þs2 Xi

  : ð22Þ
It is possible to show that the denominator is positive34, implying that hi b1, as before.
However, the strategic wage response from the rival union suggests that the critical level of
hi is higher when both countries are unionised. A comparison of (17) and (22) also
confirms that this is the case.
From (22) it is straightforward to verify that our previous results are confirmed, broadly
speaking, when both countries are unionised. Globalisation still increases union opposition
towards labour-saving innovations, as long as market sizes are not too unequal. In the two-
union case, we have that
Bhi4
Bt
b0 iff sjhj 4 b2
 þ 2 2sj  sib N0:
The underlying mechanisms are the same as in the basic model with one union, and
increased union opposition is ultimately related to the demand expanding effect of
globalisation. However, the more symmetric cost structure in the industry, compared with
the one-union case, means that trade cost reductions now increase labour demand for a
larger set of parameter configurations.
6.2. Technological catch-up and leapfrogging
Both in industrial organisation (for example, Fudenberg et al., 1983 and Reinganum,
1983) and in the trade literature (for example, Brezis et al., 1993 and Desmet, 2002),
researchers have studied models of technology leaders that rationally adopt new
technology so late that newcomers overtake them. The present model, with its focus on
harder union resistance to technology in the technologically leading nation, complements
this line of work. Let us first confirm that Propositions 2 and 3 also apply in the case with
two optimising unions. It follows from (22) that
Bhi4
Bsi
N0;
Bhi4
Bsj
b0;
Bhi4
B/i
N0;
Bhi4
B/j
b0;
which indeed confirms the results from Propositions 2 and 3 regarding the effects of
relative market size and technological (dis)advantages.34 It is straightforward to verify that the denominator of h i* is monotonically increasing in h j, which means that
it takes its lowest value for h j =0. In this case, h i* is equal to h* from the one-union case, where we have already
shown that the denominator is positive.
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new technological opportunities present themselves. Apart from the fact that today’s
technology choice influences tomorrow’s technological level, there are no dynamic
linkages in the model, so at every point in time technology leaders will have a weaker
incentive to install new technology than technology laggards. A dweaker incentiveT in
the sense that the critical value of hi is higher will not always lead to differences in
action. But with many international oligopolies of the described structure the tendency
will be that the leader country is less likely to implement new technology. One could
also imagine that the preference parameter of the union hi varies over time, so that a
lower critical value implies that a union will, in expectation, adopt new technology
sooner. This argument holds as long as a country continues to have a technological
advantage in an industry, that is, until the laggard has caught up with the leader.
However, if the leader also is the bigger country, we can even get that the laggard passes
the leader, which is what the term leapfrogging standardly refers to. Moreover, this logic
applies regardless of whether a union optimises against a non-unionised country or a
country that itself has an optimising union.
6.3. Nash wage bargaining
Now we revert to the single union case, and discuss wage bargaining. Retaining the
right-to-manage assumption, we consider a standard Nash bargaining model where the
bargaining outcome is the wage that maximises the Nash product
N ¼ pa1U 1a;
where reservation payoffs are set equal to zero, and aa (0,l) is the relative bargaining
strength of the firm.35
Straightforward calculations yield equilibrium profits
p1 ¼ q11ð Þ
2
s1
þ q12ð Þ
2
s2
:
Calculating h* becomes much harder in this case, though, as the envelope theorem does
not apply. Actually, even finding an analytical solution for the optimum wage turns out to
be an insurmountable task when tN0. Thus, we are forced to resort to numerical
simulations. For this purpose, we have designed a MATLAB program that searches for the
value of h*.36
The general conclusion to be drawn from this exercise is illustrated in Fig. 1, where h*
is plotted against trade costs for different values of a. The parameters used in this specific
example are a =100, b =0.5, w =15 and sl = s2=/1=/2=1, but numerous simulations
show that the picture given in Fig. 1 is highly representative for the symmetric cases, i.e.,
s1= s2 and /1=/2.35 Our basic monopoly union model now appears as the special case of aY0.
36 The program is available from http://www.econ.uib.no/pub/frode/theta.zip.
Fig. 1. Globalisation and union opposition under wage bargaining.
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general form, by
dU w4ð Þ
d/1
¼ BU w4ð Þ
Bw
þ BU w4ð Þ
Bn
Bn w4ð Þ
Bw
 
Bw4
B/1
þ BU w4ð Þ
Bn
Bn w4ð Þ
B/1
: ð23Þ
Compared with the monopoly union model, we can identify two main effects of wage
bargaining. First, the equilibrium wage is lower, which implies that labour demand
elasticity is lower in equilibrium. From our previous analysis, we know that this reduces
the likelihood that a labour-saving innovation increases labour demand. All else equal, this
leads to an increase in h*. But all else is not equal. Since the bargained wage is below the
utility-maximising level, the term in square brackets in (23) is now positive. Consequently,
a labour demand reduction can be compensated, in terms of union utility, by a wage
increase. From the figure it seems that, when trade costs are zero, these two effects exactly
cancel, leaving h* invariant to changes in relative bargaining strength. This result can also
be confirmed analytically.37 However, for positive trade costs, the results indicate that
the first effect dominates, implying that less union power over wage setting increases
union resistance towards technological change.
Our previous results regarding the effects of globalisation on unions’ technology
opposition are also largely confirmed under wage bargaining. Trade cost reductions–in a
large majority of the cases–still lead to an increase in h*. The only exceptions are some
combinations of very high levels of a and relatively large trade costs.38 However, one can37 If t =0, the Nash product can be expressed as N ¼ K
h
w wð Þh 1að Þ1þa q11þq12/1

 i1þa
where K :¼ /2a1
s1þs2ð Þa . Thus,
the outcome of wage bargaining is the wage that would have been chosen by a monopoly union with relative
wage orientation
h 1að Þ
1þa . It is straightforward to show that the corresponding value of h* is given by (17) for t =0.
38 In Fig. 1, the plots for lower a are made for a narrower range of t than for higher a. This is because wages are
higher when a is lower, and consequently, there are exports for a smaller range of trade costs.
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wage bargaining power are unlikely to be able to prevent or delay the adoption of labour-
saving innovations.7. Concluding remarks
Globalisation can make technology opposition from unions more likely. Increased
international integration is often seen as a force that drive economies towards efficiency
and modernisation, but we have here pinpointed an effect that works in the opposite
direction.
If unions sabotage technology adoption, this should be traceable in the many
empirical studies on unions, R&D, technology adoption, productivity, and the like.
Menezes-Filho and Van Reenen (2003) summarise this body of work as follows: bNorth
American results find consistently strong and negative impacts of unions on R&D. By
contrast, European studies (mainly in the UK) generally do not uncover negative effects
of unions on R&D. There is no consensus of the effects of unions on our other main
measures: technological diffusion, innovation or productivity growth even in the North
American studies. These cross-country differences in the R&D impact of unions could
represent either unsolved econometrics problems or genuine institutional differences
between nations in union attitudes and ability to bargain. We suspect the latter is the
main reason.Q
Unions hurt technology adoption in some circumstances and not in others.
Theoretical studies like this one hopefully can help pinpoint when what happens, to
the aid both of empirical studies and of policy. One should be careful to draw strong
policy conclusions from a model of any one specified institutional set-up. This said, the
central problem is–as in many other models of trade unionism–that the union has too
much power over certain decision variables relative to others. Here, this means too much
power over technology and wages relative to employment decisions. This can in general
be solved either by increasing union power over some variables, or decreasing union
power over others. A nationwide corporativist union might take the long-term
consequences for most of the population into account, so that the outcome resembles
that achieved under efficient bargaining. Taking away a union’s power to sabotage
technology would of course also eliminate the problem that globalisation fosters
technology opposition.
Given the assumed structure–a strong union in an oligopolist firm that does not take
into account the long-term effect of its own actions on the wider economy–it is actually
beneficial for technology adoption that the union is wage-oriented rather than
employment-oriented. A wage-oriented union could be seen as a union where the
preferences of the dinsidersT in the union dominate over the doutsidersT with less secure
jobs. Job protection that increases with seniority and other measures that strengthen insider
power will here in fact have the surprising side-effect of making the union more prone to
accept technological change. Such changes typically increases the wages of insiders—job
losses will have to be carried by the marginal doutsidersT, which is of no concern to an
insider dominated union.
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